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Communication Freedoms versus Communication Rights: 
Discursive and Normative struggles within Civil Society and Beyond 
 
Bart Cammaerts 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
In this chapter, I aim to retrace the normative implications of historical and 
contemporary debates and struggles between discourses and activists aiming 
to protect press freedom and those advocating for the need of communication 
rights and media regulation. I will argue that this conflict can be related to 
distinct normative positions concerning the role of media and communication 
in a democratic society, and competing views as to the balance of power in 
society between market forces and the state.  
 
Press freedom is very much part of a longstanding liberal model concerned 
with the tyranny of the state, while a communication rights agenda pertains 
more to a social responsibility and public sphere paradigm which emphasizes 
the need of state intervention. While one advocates the need to protect us 
from state intervention, the other precisely requires the state to intervene in 
order to guarantee certain rights. It was almost inevitable that these two 
perspectives would clash at some point, especially as the rights agenda was 
high-jacked by many authoritarian regimes to justify limits on press freedom.  
 
I will address this tension in the context of three key-moments of contention, 
1) the conflicts relating to UNESCO’s MacBride Report (1980), 2) the conflicts 
in view of the final declaration of ITU’s World Summit on the Information 
Society (WSIS) which was held in Geneva (2003) and Tunis (2005) and 3) the 
Leveson inquiry into the ethics of the UK press held in 2011-2012. In each of 
these cases advocates of press freedom clashed with proponents of 
communication rights.  
 
Before addressing these cases, I will first present a brief theoretical 
framework, based on Berlin’s distinction between negative and positive 
liberties, which will subsequently serve to contextualize the discursive and 
normative conflicts between communication freedoms and rights. By relating 
this conflict to these two competing forms of liberties, I aim to demonstrate 
how intra-civil society struggles are also instrumental in the ideological 
conflict resisting the regulation of media ownership and the imposition of 
democratic protections against the commercialization and commodification of 
the public space. 
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Negative and Positive Liberties 
 
In his famous essay entitled ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, Berlin (1958) deals 
with a set of inherent tensions, between: freedom and equality, a coercive and 
an emancipatory state, personal autonomy and collective endeavors. It 
concerns here, in other words, competing and intrinsically incompatible 
political ideas concerning freedom and rights.  
 
The classic – and according to Berlin the preferred – way of conceptualizing 
liberty, is in negative terms; being free from coercion, reaching your full 
potential without the interference by external others. To be free is, in other 
words, to be a fully independent agent with total control over your own 
destiny. With reference to Mill’s (1859) position, Berlin (1969 [1958]: 126-7 – 
emphasis in original) writes that ‘[t]he defense of liberty consists in the 
negative goal of warding off interference’. It is negative because it pleads for 
the absence of something – i.e. interference or coercion. From the perspective 
of negative freedom, state power should thus be limited to an absolute 
minimum; rather individuals need to be (legally) protected from state power. 
Berlin is, however, also critical of this classic position as it all too easily 
assumes that all coercion is necessarily evil and all non-interference is 
inherently good, which is not always the case.  
 
The second, competing, conceptualization of freedom starts from a radically 
different premise, namely a sensitivity towards the conditions which 
determine the nature of our freedoms and a concern with collective rather 
than individualistic goals and values. Positive freedom implicates the 
common good and the development of a collective will through which the 
individual is supposedly able to achieve ‘true’ or ‘genuine’ self-
determination. As Berlin (1969 [1958]: 132 – emphasis in original) explains: 
 
The real self may be conceived as something wider than the individual […], 
as a social whole of which the individual is an element or an aspect: a tribe, a 
race, a Church, a State, the great society of the living and the dead and the yet 
unborn. This entity is then identified as being the true self which, by imposing 
its collective, or organic single will upon its recalcitrant members, achieves its 
own, and therefore their, higher freedom. 
 
Positive freedoms thus justify emancipatory interventions (by the state or a 
collective) to create the conditions for freedom and self-mastery through the 
provision of resources to citizens to fulfill their full potential and self-
determination, such as free education, health care, welfare, or through 
guaranteeing equal opportunities for all.  
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As is already apparent in the quote above, Berlin was highly skeptical of 
positive freedoms especially due to the potential of abuse of state power in 
the name of a higher goal, using the Jacobin and Bolshevik revolutions as a 
case in point. As a result of this danger, he and many others with him, 
promote positive freedoms over and above negative ones.  
 
It is, in my view, the perceived incommensurability between negative and 
positive freedoms that lies at the heart of the conflict between advocates of the 
protection of press freedom, which relates to negative freedom and those that 
advocate communication rights, which inevitably relies more on positive 
freedoms to establish and subsequently enforce rights. In what follows three 
cases where this tension came to a head will be addressed in more detail, first 
UNESCO’s MacBride Report, second the UN’s WSIS and lastly the Leveson 
Inquiry into media ethics in the UK. 
 
UNESCO’s MacBride-Report (1980) 
 
In 1977, Amadu Mohtar M’Bow, UNESCO’s Director-general at the time, 
tasked an International Commission for the Study of Communication to write a 
report on the emerging problems of new communication technologies and the 
impact of these on the already existing asymmetries between core, semi-
periphery and periphery, to refer to Wallerstein’s world system model, which 
was published a few years earlier (Wallerstein, 1974). While the appointment 
of the Commission was very much a means to appease the ideological 
confrontations and conflicts concerning information and communication 
between Western, Communist and non-aligned countries, the report it 
produced ended up exasperating them. The cold war was in full swing and 
information provision and communication infrastructures became 
unavoidably a focal point of contention.  
 
The so-called MacBride report, named after the much respected chair of the 
Commission, Seán MacBride, an Irish journalist, human rights activist and 
politician, was in many ways an astonishing international document and 
statement; clear-cut and critical in its analysis and diagnosis, progressive and 
daring in its prognosis and proposed solutions. In the report, the authors took 
a critical stance against the devastating impact of marketization and they 
emphasized the social importance of communication. Communication was 
furthermore positioned as an unalienable human right. The idea of a right to 
communicate was originally proposed by Jean d’Arcy in an essay published 
in 1969 and the Commission appropriated it to extend communication 
freedoms beyond press freedom (MacBride, 2004 [1980]: 265). As one of the 
co-authors of the report put it later, ‘the freedom of press (and freedom of 
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information) was enriched with the right to communicate, the right to accept 
and spread information and to be informed’ (Osolnik, 2005: 8).  
 
The Commission unequivocally sided with citizen interests and promoted 
above all democratic values. Exclusive and intrusive state control as well as 
oligopolistic corporate control of the media were considered equally 
problematic. The ever-increasing concentration of ownership and the 
emergence of powerful oligopolies in the media market were strongly 
condemned. Instead, communication was approached as a genuine two-way 
process rather than a one-way communication flow from top to bottom or 
from North to South. The many asymmetries between North and South were 
also highlighted as troublesome and in urgent need of redress. At the same 
time, it was also argued – in a nuanced way – that with (press) freedom comes 
responsibility:  
 
Freedom without responsibility invites distortion and other abuses. But in the 
absence of freedom there can be no exercise of responsibility. The concept of 
freedom with responsibility necessarily includes a concern for professional 
ethics, demanding an equitable approach to events, situations or processes 
with due attention to their diverse aspects. (MacBride, 2004 [1980]: 261-2) 
 
The Commission also proposed a set of recommendations which would lead 
to a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO), a sort of 
third way avant-la-lettre, positioned in-between unbridled liberalism and 
monopolistic state ownership (Osolnik, 2005: 10).  
 
At a general conference in Belgrade in October 1980 UNESCO agreed on a 
resolution spelling out the principles of NWICO, including the elimination of 
‘imbalances and inequalities’ and of ‘the negative effects of certain 
monopolies, public or private, and excessive concentrations’ (UNESCO, 1980: 
71). It goes without saying that the aftermath of this meeting, during which 
NWICO was approved, was marred by serious conflicts and had long-lasting 
repercussions. Probably the most spectacular of these was the withdrawal of 
the US and the UK (as well as Singapore) from UNESCO. However, less 
known are the fierce debates concerning the right to communicate and 
NWICO within civil society, mainly focusing on the tension between a 
negative freedom of the press and a communication rights agenda requiring 
positive freedoms to guarantee and protect these rights.  
 
The World Press Freedom Committee1 (WPFC), an international lobby group 
of editors and media owners specifically set-up to contest NWICO, was most 
vocal in opposing it. Bullen (1981: 9) wrote a highly skeptical piece on 
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UNESCO’s Belgrade meeting in which she fundamentally contested the good 
intentions of NWICO: 
 
the first principle is "elimination of imbalances and inequalities" in 
communication.  There are lots of ways to take such words, whatever the 
merits of the case. One person's "inequality" may be another's "editorial 
freedom." Another principle suggested in the resolution is that the "freedom 
of journalists" is "inseparable from responsibility.'' But there are very different 
ideas of what "responsible" journalism is. In some countries, it's "responsible" 
to follow a story wherever it leads. In others, it's "responsible" to drop a story 
if it leads in the wrong direction.  
 
Throughout Bullen’s report of the Belgrade meeting, a sense of deep-seated 
distrust can be observed. While the MacBride Report was said to contain 
‘some good ideas, such as opposition to censorship and free access to news 
sources by journalists’, overall it was considered to be a ‘batch of mischievous 
proposals’ (ibid) providing the intellectual justification for Communist and 
authoritarian regimes to impose limits on press freedom and on the activities 
of journalists; it was seen to promote the abuse of positive freedom to curtail 
negative freedom.  
 
It is within this context that in May 1981, about 60 delegates to the Voices of 
Freedom Conference of Independent News Media and representing many regional 
and international journalism organisations, agreed on a strong statement to 
uphold an absolute negative press freedom, free from any form of state 
intervention. In their so-called the ‘Declaration of Talloires’ they pledged ‘to 
expand the free flow of information worldwide’. They furthermore called 
upon ‘UNESCO and other intergovernmental bodies to abandon attempts to 
regulate news content and formulate rules for the press’. A strong rejection of 
all forms of positive freedom was also adopted:  
 
We believe that the state exists for the individual and has a duty to uphold 
individual rights. We believe that the ultimate definition of a free press lies 
not in the actions of governments or international bodies, but rather in the 
professionalism, vigor and courage of individual journalists. (Declaration of 
Talloires, 1981) 
 
What is frightfully absent from these anti-NWICO discourses is a mentioning 
of potential issues regarding media ownership, concentration of ownership, 
commodification and the impact this has on the production of media content 
and on editorial freedom. The privileging of negative freedom over and above 
positive freedom in the context of information provision and communication 
implies an imaginary which considers ‘free’ and ‘freedom’ to be unavoidably 
and necessarily market-led, which is in itself never problematized or 
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considered potentially detrimental for democracy. This subsequently fed into 
a broader imaginary advocating the privatization and marketization of media 
and telecommunication, which became the new mantras of the 1990s. This 
neoliberal logic reduces the provision of information and communication to a 
mere commodity rather than a public service or a societal democratic good.  
 
 
ITU’s World Summit on the Information Society (2003-2005) 
 
Fast forward to early 2000s. When it became clear that the asymmetrical 
introduction of the internet was re-enforcing old divides as well as producing 
new ones, the UN decided to act and called for a World Summit on the 
Information Society (WSIS) in order to address ‘the whole range of relevant 
issues related to the information society’ (UN, 2001: 1). Not UNESCO, but 
rather the ITU, was mandated by the General Assembly to organise and run 
the WSIS. This was a significant and telling choice. Raboy (2003: 110) 
observed that ‘[w]ithin the UNESCO logic, media are cultural institutions, 
part of the process of human development. Within the ITU logic, media are 
technical systems for information delivery’.  
 
This choice did not mean that the cultural perspective was absent from the 
WSIS, on the contrary, but these tensions did inevitably lead to a clash 
between different visions or what could be called ‘social imaginaries’ of the 
internet (Mansell, 2012) and above all about what the role of the state should 
be within the information society.  
 
In terms of process, an all-together different strategy was chosen compared to 
what UNESCO did in the 1980s. There was no appointed commission of wise 
grey-haired ‘men’, carefully gathering evidence and writing up an eloquent 
report, which would then provide the basis for debate and discussion. 
Instead, in true multi-stakeholder fashion, UN Resolution 56/183 encouraged 
‘intergovernmental organisations, including international and regional 
institutions, non-governmental organisations, civil society and the private 
sector to contribute to, and actively participate in the intergovernmental 
preparatory process of the Summit and the Summit itself’. (UN, 2001a: 2 –
emphasis added).  
 
The UN/ITU WSIS process and the invitation of civil society to actively 
participate in the preparatory process was perceived by some as a golden 
opportunity to revive the demand for the establishment and protection of a 
set of communication rights (Calabrese, 2004). By publishing the People’s 
Communication Charter (PCC) some years earlier, Hamelink (1998) had 
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already prepared the ground for a return of a communication rights discourse 
into civil society discourse and the communication policy realm.  
 
In view of the upcoming WSIS, the Communication Rights in the Information 
Society (CRIS) campaign was officially launched in November 2001 at the 
World Social Forum in Porto Alegre (Brazil) and the stated aim was to ‘help 
build an information society based on principles of transparency, diversity, 
participation and social and economic justice, and inspired by equitable 
gender, cultural and regional perspectives’. It explicitly referred back to the 
MacBride-report by adopting the right to communicate as ‘a means to 
enhance human rights and to strengthen the social, economic and regional 
perspectives’, invoking positive freedoms (CRIS Mission Statement, 2001). 
This attempt to introduce a progressive and democratic agenda into the WSIS 
preparatory process was fiercely resisted, by market forces, obviously, but 
also by some State actors and by some civil society actors. 
 
Regarding the latter, the World Press Freedom Committee (WPFC) voiced its 
continued opposition to this cheeky attempt to revive the MacBride legacy. In 
a rather blunt and strong-worded piece, the European Representative of the 
WPFC launched a personal attack on Hamelink and wrote:  
 
No new rights are needed. Those who have advocated the “Right to 
Communicate” define it in terms that would legitimize censorship and other 
limits on the unrestricted practice of journalism. These advocates depict this 
“Right to Communicate” as a collective right that supersedes individual 
human rights and harks back to directly to the same proposals they made 
under the banner of the “New World Information and Communication 
Order”. (Koven, 2003a: np) 
 
In another piece, the same representative described the CRIS-campaign as 
‘radical’ and its demands as ‘extreme’ (Koven, 2003b). The tainted baggage of 
the 1980s right to communicate debate was remobilised against the 
communication rights agenda proposed by the CRIS campaign in the 
framework of the WSIS – ‘The bad new ideas are the bad old ideas. In some 
cases, they even are being pushed by the same people’, Bullen (2003: 11) 
wrote. Besides the WPFC, the freedom of expression NGO Article XIX also 
reacted strongly against all attempts by civil society actors to articulate a set 
of communication rights for the information society. Unlike the WPFC, 
Article XIX did, however, acknowledge the value of communication rights, 
but it considered ‘that there is the potential within the framework of existing 
rights to accommodate the legitimate claims made in the name of the right to 
communicate’ (Mendel, 2003). 
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Just as was the case with NWICO in the 1980s, advocates of press freedom 
agreed on a declaration, this time arguing for a regulation-free internet, but 
also explicitly condemning all attempts to revive a communication rights 
agenda.  
 
A number of proposals for regulation and controls now being made were 
made and rejected during past debate over now-discredited proposals for a 
“new world information and communication order.” There are clearly those 
at work who seek to revive and assert for their own purposes such restrictive 
proposals in the new guise of countering alleged threats and dangers posed 
by new communication technologies. These proposals must again be 
successfully resisted, just as they were earlier. (Statement of Vienna, 2002: 
point 9)  
Despite all the efforts of communication rights activists to deny this, 
communication rights were positioned by the proponents of press freedom as 
a mere code word for censorship and the impositions of restrictions on the 
negative freedom of expression.  
 
Yet again we can observe here a clash here between those fighting for a 
voluntaristic agenda through positive freedoms and those who approach 
freedom in a negative sense, i.e. the need to protect us all from state 
intervention, regardless of what that intervention aims to achieve. In other 
words, in both cases we see that a broader political struggle is being played 
out which crystalizes around communication and different conceptions of 
freedom and state intervention. 
 
 
The UK’s Leveson Inquiry (2011-2012) 
 
The two previous cases were situated at an international level of governance, 
whereas the case presented in this section relates to a national context. It 
could be argued that the tensions between positive and negative freedom 
become more concrete and real given in a national context, precisely because 
nation states have more leeway to actually implement binding (media and 
communication) regulation that is enforceable. At the national level the realm 
of the discursive can potentially have real and actual policy implications for 
the media organisations that operate there. 
 
After it emerged that large parts of the British media had been using private 
detectives on a large scale to hack into mobile phones of celebrities, political 
elites, the royal family as well as ordinary citizens, including a murdered girl 
(Milly Dowler), the issue of media ethics, the lack of accountability of the 
media and media concentration propelled itself firmly onto the political 
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agenda in the UK. In order to address these issues the Prime Minister David 
Cameron, appointed Lord Justice Leveson to lead an inquiry into two parts. 
The first part, which concluded in 2012, was to investigate  
 
the culture, practices and ethics of the press, including contacts between the 
press and politicians and the press and the police; it is to consider the extent 
to which the current regulatory regime has failed and whether there has been 
a failure to act upon any previous warnings about media misconduct. (Press 
Release, 14/09/2011) 
 
The second part on the Inquiry, which is supposed to address the ‘extent of 
unlawful and improper conduct’ by several news organisations, including 
Rupert Murdoch’s News International, still has to take place (criminal 
investigations are ongoing).  
 
Essentially, the Leveson Inquiry amounted to a ‘damning indictment’ of the 
UK’s news industry, as pointed out by Chris Blackburn, the editor of the 
Independent at the time (quoted in O’Carroll, 2012). Furthermore, the nature 
and extent of the unethical behaviour displayed by British journalists and 
editors also called into question the self-regulatory regime that was supposed 
to counter and prevent such behaviour in the first place. Overall, the Press 
Complaints Council (PCC) was seen to be weak, ineffective and in urgent 
need of reform. The broader question, however, was whether self-regulation 
was sufficient or whether there is a case for statutory regulation of the press, 
inevitably invoking positive freedoms. Leveson himself considered this 
question to be at the heart of his inquiry. When opening the hearings (on 
14/11/2011), he explicitly referred to the importance of the watch dog role of 
the media, but he also asked the contentious question ‘who guards the 
guardians?’.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the most important recommendation of Leveson was a 
reform of the self-regulatory PCC, making it more independent from the 
media owners, but also giving it more teeth. In order to do so, Leveson 
controversially recommended that ‘there should be legislation to underpin 
the independent self-regulatory system and facilitate its recognition in legal 
processes’ (The Leveson Inquiry, 2012: 17). While Leveson pointed out that 
this could be done without needing to resort to a statutory regulation of the 
press, many journalists and commentators did read it in those terms (f.e. 
Hislop, 2012). 
 
Besides the phone hacking scandal and ethical transgressions by journalists, 
Leveson was also tasked to investigate the high level of media concentration 
and lack of media pluralism in the UK (three companies control some 70% of 
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newspaper circulation2). However, unlike the very detailed and well-argued 
recommendations regarding a new framework for an independent press 
regulator, the recommendations relating to media plurality were rather 
vague. Despite this vagueness, he did conclude that a new method to measure 
media plurality was needed (The Leveson Inquiry, 2012: 30). The report also 
concluded that the threshold for concern in terms of the concentration of 
ownership should be lower in the media industry than is the case in other 
industries given the specific nature of media power in a democracy, but it 
refrained from recommending what this threshold should be. 
 
Just as in the two other cases, we could observe a lot of activity within civil 
society to either support Leveson’s recommendations or contest them 
vigorously. Regarding the former, an organisation called Hacked Off 3 
campaigned for an accountable press and made the implementation of 
Leveson’s recommendations as its raison d’être (Cathcart, 2013). Hacked off 
received a lot of flak from right wing commentators and press freedom 
advocates for being an enemy of press freedom (Hislop, 2012). Besides this, 
because high profile celebrities keen on privacy protection were officially 
backing the campaign (f.e. Hugh Grant, Steve Coogan, J.K. Rowling, John 
Cleese, etc.), many critics framed Hacked Off as a toy in the hand of the 
powerful elites in their attempts to stop journalists reporting on them 
negatively.  
 
The Media Reform Coalition is another organisation that was set-up in the 
wake of the Leveson Inquiry. It brings together civil society groups, 
academics and media campaigners and is committed to support media 
pluralism, defend ethical journalism and protect investigative and local 
journalism. This group was also virulently attacked by right wing 
commentators for being run by ‘left wing academics’ and being 
‘interventionist’ (Gillian, 2013). The rightwing blogger Guido Fawkes called 
the ‘Reclaim the Media’ event, organized by the Media Reform Coalition, 
‘sinister’ (Fawkes, 2014). 
 
Besides journalists and right wing bloggers, several competing civil society 
organisations also rallied against Leveson and those who support his 
recommendations. The Freespeech Network, comprised of media owners, 
editors, publishers and advertisers and supported amongst others by the 
WPFC, was set-up in reaction against the Leveson Inquiry’s recommendations 
and was very vocal in its derision of Leveson, denoting his recommendations 
as ‘illiberal’ and stating that ‘[t]he fallout from the Leveson Inquiry and report 
has left the British press facing the most substantial threat to its freedom in 
the modern era’ (Anthony, et al., 2015: 16). Especially the establishment of a 
new self-regulatory independent body through a cross-party Royal Charter, 
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not dissimilar to how the BBC was established, was a point of contention. 
Article XIX refutes the claim that this body is self-regulatory and argued that 
it falls ‘short of international standards to protect freedom of expression’ 
(Article XIX, 2013).  
 
Yet again in this case we see a similar expression of the long-standing 
conflicts emerging between those advocating for the negative freedom of the 
press and those fighting for positive freedoms to regulate media markets for 
example to promote ethical behaviour amongst journalists or enforce media 
plurality.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As I have argued in this chapter, the main reason for the lack of a viable 
middle ground between press freedom advocates and freedom of information 
activists lies in the incommensurability of negative and positive forms of 
freedom. Each attempt to posit positive freedoms in terms of media and 
communication is countered by accusations of infringement to the negative 
freedom of expression/the press. Incidentally, the discursive equation of 
freedom of speech with freedom of the press is telling in this regard. O’Neill 
argued some years ago to decouple both given the high degree of media 
power. The media, she said, ‘while deeply preoccupied with others' 
untrustworthiness–have escaped demands for accountability’. Furthermore, 
‘freedom of the press does not also require a licence to deceive’ (O’Neill, 
2002). 
 
At the same time, we can also observe a subtle and under-stated inter-twining 
between the arguments of negative press freedom with a neoliberal ideology 
and discourse which at a meta-level precisely justifies and hegemonises the 
superiority of negative freedoms over and above positive freedoms 
(Cammaerts, 2015). This then in turns justifies a withdrawal of the state and 
feeds arguments for very minimal and preferably no intervention at all. The 
result of all this is a normative gridlock, which makes it impossible to argue 
for a voluntaristic media policy agenda aimed at guaranteeing 
communication as a human right and the promotion of a pluralistic 
democratic mediated public space. From this neoliberal perspective, freedom 
is pitted against regulation as fundamentally incompatible.  
 
Positioning pubic interventions into the media and communication ‘industry’ 
as antithetical to freedom and refusing any kind of regulation to protect the 
communication rights of citizens, suits a number of political and economic 
actors particularly well, hence the very active involvement of media 
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proprietors in these debates. Questions relating to the quality and ethics of the 
content produced by the capitalist ‘free’ media or important issues regarding 
the concentration of media ownership within but also across the different 
sectors of the media and communication industry are too easily swept aside 
by strongly worded arguments expressing negative freedoms when it comes 
to media and communication. 
 
Overcoming this gridlock is not straightforward as press freedom and 
communication rights are both part of a human rights agenda and we also 
need to acknowledge the tensions between them. What might help, however, 
is articulating communication freedoms and communication rights as a 
productive dialectic between both negative and positive freedoms and their 
corresponding rights. Positive freedoms thus become essential to guarantee 
and underpin negative freedoms, especially if we acknowledge that a truly 
free press should not only protect us from abuses by the sta te, but crucially 
also from abuses by market-forces abiding by commercial interests and 
leading to serious unethical and anti-democratic behaviour by media elites. 
Seen from this perspective, public and democratic interventions in the media 
in order to ensure that media power is made accountable, is dispersed and 
fosters substantial increases in the quality of news provision to citizens 
become legitimate. As even Berlin (1969 [1958]: 124) pointed out:  
 
[…] no man's activity is so completely private as never to obstruct the lives of 
others in any way. 'Freedom for the pike is death for the minnows'; the liberty 
of some must depend on the restraint of others. 
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